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Citizenship and the Courts
Nancy Morawetzt

Over the past decade, Congress, the press, and the academy
have devoted substantial attention to the system for judicial
oversight of deportation matters. After Congress revamped the
system in two separate laws in 1996, both courts and scholars
wrote in depth about the potential constitutional issues raised by
efforts to close off judicial review.1 Congress's further alterations
of the judicial review scheme in 2005 led to additional scholarly
attention. 2 This attention will no doubt continue, given the very
serious questions presented by statutory provisions that strip or

t Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law. I am greatly indebted to Hiroshi Motomura for valuable insights into an earlier draft of this paper. I also
thank the participants in the conference at the University of Chicago Legal Forum's Immigration Law and Policy Symposium, and the Legal Forum for its editorial work. This
article benefited from excellent research assistance by Annie Lai, NYU Law '06, and from
conversations with Stephanie Welch, NYU Law '06, and Rachel Coen, NYU Law '06. The
author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the D'Agostino/Greenberg Research Fund.
1 See, for example, Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the
Removal of Aliens, 98 Colum L Rev 961 (1998) (arguing that courts, in light of the Habeas
Corpus Suspension Clause of the Constitution, ought to interpret recent immigration
legislation so as to allow judicial inquiry in deportation proceedings); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, 98 Colum L Rev 1068 (1998)
(calling for the public rights and plenary powers doctrines to be reexamined in the immigration context and asserting that preclusion of all judicial review of immigration detentions and deportation proceedings would violate the Constitution); Lenni B. Benson, Back
to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to JudicialReview of Immigration Proceedings,
29 Conn L Rev 1411 (1997) (suggesting that Congressional curtailment of judicial review
in recent immigration legislation may bring about the "constitutionalization" of judicial
review in immigration matters); INS v St Cyr, 533 US 289, 298-314 (2001) (interpreting
1996 amendments to judicial review as preserving access to habeas corpus).
2 Congress made the changes in the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L No 109-13, Div B,
119 Stat 231, codified at 8 USC § 1252. For discussions of the changes caused by the
REAL ID Act, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction
Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 Cornell L Rev 459 (2006) (discussing lessons from
litigation about the 1996 judicial review scheme for habeas corpus jurisdiction after the
REAL ID Act); Seeking Review: Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction,51 NY
L Sch L Rev 1 (2006-07) (symposium examining restrictions placed on judicial review of
removal decisions).
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constrain judicial review over issues of deportation and the sepa3
ration of family members.
There has been scant attention, however, to a parallel judicial role in determining whether a lawful permanent resident
meets the standards for citizenship. 4 This role concertis one of
the paramount interests of immigrants. Through citizenship,
immigrants gain many rights, including the right to vote, the
right to engage in all forms of employment, and the right to be
free from the threat of deportation. 5
Although the judicial role in naturalization dates back to
1790,6 the current statutory scheme was put in place in 1990.
This scheme places initial responsibility for adjudication of naturalization with agency officials, and sets up two routes to judicial
intervention. One path to intervention is for cases in which the
agency has failed to adjudicate the case within 120 days. In these
cases, the statute provides that the court "has jurisdiction over
3 Under 8 USC § 1252(a)(2), for example, courts are not permitted to hear certain
issues and claims by persons with specified convictions. Review is available under REAL
ID, however, if the issue presented is a "question of law." 8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(D). One
major focus of ongoing litigation is the scope of 8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(D). Consider Chen v
United States DOJ,471 F3d 315, 326 (2d Cir 2006) (interpreting scope of the term "question of law" to avoid constitutional infirmity).
4 Scholars have begun to devote greater attention to questions about the path to
acquiring American citizenship. Consider Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The
Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States (Oxford 2006) (presenting
the case for treating new immigrants as "Americans in Waiting" on a course to citizenship); Peter J. Spiro, Questioning Barriersto Naturalization, 13 Georgetown Immig L J
479, 479 (1999); Irene Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen (2006) (comparing immigrant incorporation policies in the United States and Canada); Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S.
NaturalizationPolicies, 35 Va J Intl L 237 (1994) (exploring normative models for naturalization policy). There has also been some study of the administrative naturalization
system. Consider Arnold Rochvarg, Report to the Administrative Conference-Reforming
the Administrative NaturalizationProcess: Reducing Delays While IncreasingFairness, 9
Georgetown Immig L J 397 (1995). But there has been no attention to the judicial role in
naturalization after 1990. A 1995 study commissioned by the Administrative Conference,
based on 120 interviews of immigration providers, local governmental groups, attorneys,
and government officials, found that those interviewed had never invoked the statutory
provision for judicial intervention in cases of delay and generally lacked experience with
substantive naturalization cases in federal court. Id at 434-35. Prior studies are based on
data that predate the 1990 reforms. Consider Peter H. Schuck and Theodore Hsien Wang,
Continuity and Change: Patterns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990, 45
Stan L Rev 115 (1992) (conducting a descriptive study of immigration litigation from
1979-1990); Louis DeSipio and Harry P. Pachon, Making Americans: Administrative
Discretion and Americanization, 12 Chicano-Latino L Rev 52 (1992) (evaluating immigration related information gathered under the pre-1990 regime); David S. North, The Long
Grey Welcome: A Study of the American NaturalizationProgram, 21 Intl Migration Rev
311 (1987) (studying the administrative structure of the U.S. naturalization process).
5 Consider Motomura, Americans in Waiting at 189-197 (cited in note 4) (describing
limitations faced by permanent residents who are not yet citizens).
6 See Part I A.
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the matter and may either determine the matter or remand the
matter, with appropriate instructions, to the Service to determine the matter." 7 The second path is for cases in which the person is denied naturalization initially and again following an administrative appeal. In these cases, the statute provides for a
petition to a district court and states that "review shall be de
novo, and the court shall make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall, at the request of the petitioner, conduct
8
a hearing de novo on the application."
Courts exercising jurisdiction in naturalization cases have
been unsure of their proper institutional role. At one extreme,
some courts have concluded that the only appropriate remedy
when a case has been delayed is to remand the case for an
agency decision.9 In doing so, they have presumed that they
should operate under an administrative review model where
agency action is necessary prior to any court action. At the other
extreme, some courts have presumed that the courts stand as
parallel adjudicators who do not look to the record developed at
the agency but instead hear naturalization cases on the merits
after civil discovery.' 0 These courts have adopted a civil litigation
model in which there is no review of the agency's decision.
Recent congressional proposals to change the judicial review
scheme for naturalization cases have simply assumed that the
correct model is one in which the courts sit in review of agency
action. In 2006, without any serious study of the matter," Congress came close to overturning the historic statutory authority
of the courts to make de novo determinations about who should
be afforded citizenship. In both houses of Congress, sweeping
immigration bills included provisions that would have altered
the administrative and judicial scheme for naturalization cases.
These bills passed both chambers. The House sought to eliminate
district court review of three longstanding requirements for citizenship: "good moral character," "attachment to the principles of
the Constitution," and being "well disposed to the good order and
7 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA") § 336(b), Pub L No 82-414, 66
Stat 163, as amended by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-649, 104 Stat 4978,
codified at 8 USC § 1447(b).
s INA § 310(c), 8 USC § 1421(c).
9 See Part II A.
10 See Part II B.
11 House Adopts H.R. 4437, 82 Interp Rel 2014, 2014-15 (Dec 19, 2005) (describing
rapidity of consideration of the House bill). The Senate offered more process, but like the
House had no hearings. The bills were complex, and the citizenship provisions received
minimal attention.
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happiness of the United States."'12 In addition, the House bill
proposed to add new criteria based on an expansive "terrorist
activity" definition that would not be subject to any judicial oversight.' 3 It further proposed that courts be restricted to evaluating
whether the agency's rationale was "bona fide."'14 Finally, the
House proposed curtailing the authority of the courts to decide
the merits of a naturalization case when the agency had not issued a timely decision.' 5 The Senate bill adopted many of these
provisions, although it preserved a greater degree of judicial review over naturalization denials. 16 Under the Senate bill, courts
would apply a deferential substantial evidence standard for review of "good moral character," "understands and is attached to
the Constitution," and "is well disposed to the good order and
happiness of the United States."' 7 Either approach would greatly
increase the substantive power of the administrative agency to
determine who is and is not allowed to naturalize. Ultimately,
the two chambers failed to reconcile their competing immigration
reform bills. The fact that some version of these proposals passed
both houses, however, shows that these past bills need to be
taken seriously as Congress continues to debate immigration
reform.
This article seeks to unpack the origins of the current statutory scheme for judicial review, provide some initial evaluation of
whether it is working to achieve the goals Congress sought to
achieve in 1990, and explore criteria for the judicial role in naturalization cases. Part I discusses the evolution of the current
statutory scheme for judicial intervention in naturalization
cases. Part II describes how the 1990 changes in the structure of
administrative and judicial review have led to judicial confusion
about the proper role of the courts and have failed fully to meet
the objectives of the 1990 reforms. Finally, Part III argues that
12 See HR 4437 § 609(fa 109th Cong, 1st Sess (Dec 6, 2005), in 151 Cong Rec H 11800
(Dec 15, 2005).
13 Id at § 609(a) (adding new bars to naturalization for any person who is "described
in" INA §§ 212(a)(3) or 237(a)(4); further allowing the determination to be based on any
information, including classified evidence, and making the agency's evaluation of the
evidence unreviewable).
14 Id at § 609(f) ('The burden shall be upon the petitioner to show that the Secretary's
denial of the application was not supported by facially legitimate and bona fide reasons.").
15 Id at § 609(e).
16 See S 2611 § 204(d), 109th Cong, 2d Sess, in 152 Cong Rec S 3377 (May 25, 2006)
(providing for substantial evidence review of the administrative record in appeals from
denials of naturalization).
17 See id.
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the root of the courts' confusion in naturalization cases is their
effort to fit the cases into either a standard model of court review
of agency action or a parallel civil litigation model. I argue that
neither model works well in light of the special nature of claims
to citizenship. I further argue that a hybrid model that combines
features of each is well designed to protect the interest in fair
access to citizenship and best explains the structure of the current law.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NATURALIZATION CASES

Many aspects of the current statutory scheme governing the
judicial role in naturalization cases, including the express authority to take jurisdiction over a case that has not completed the
agency process and the standard of de novo review, are unusual
in the administrative state.1 8 The first step towards making
sense of this system is to examine how it evolved. This history
makes clear that Congress has viewed naturalization as a different kind of right than most matters handled by agencies and has
responded to the special nature of citizenship claims through
procedures meant to afford enhanced protections to those seeking
citizenship.
A.

The History of Judicial Naturalization

The history of judicial naturalization dates back more than
two centuries. Under the first naturalization act in 1790, petitions for naturalization were to be filed in court. 19 Petitions could
be filed in "any common law court of record" in the state where
the person had resided for the previous year. 20 Later statutes
altered some of the requirements for citizenship, but the basic
process of taking cases to any court in the petitioner's state of
residence remained through the next century. 21

18 Although unusual, they are not unprecedented. Appeals of denials of Freedom of
Information requests also go to district court and are reviewed on a de novo standard. 5
USC § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000) (providing for de novo district court review of agency withholding of records).
19 Act of Mar 26, 1790, An Act to Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization, 1 Stat
103, repealed by Act of Jan 29, 1795, 1 Stat 414.
20 Id.

21 Consider James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870
248-86 (North Carolina 1978) (describing the process for obtaining American citizenship
during the first half of the nineteenth century).
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As Luis DeSipio and Harry Pachon have described, the decentralized system of naturalization provided ample room for
abuse. They describe one study, for example, that found that
Tammany Hall bosses arranged for naturalization of Irish immigrants the day they arrived in the United States; these immigrants could not possibly have met the residence requirements
for citizenship. 22 A 1905 report by the Commission on Naturalization found fraud by political machines that would pay naturalization fees and sometimes additional bribes for the votes they
expected immigrants to cast. 23 The report also concluded that
there was no effective oversight of false statements regarding the
date that immigrants arrived in the country. 24 In response to the
Commission's report, Congress altered the naturalization system
to strip many state courts of the authority to naturalize, and it
established a requirement that petitioners provide advance notice of their petition to allow for government investigation of
25
their qualifications for citizenship.
By the late 1980s, when Congress was considering proposals
for reform that led to the Immigration Act of 1990,26 the agency
played an increasingly important role in the process for naturalization. Nevertheless, the ultimate authority to decide naturalization cases continued to rest with the courts. The statute provided
that exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize lay in the district courts
and some state courts. 27 Petitioners were required to file an application for naturalization with the clerk of the naturalization
court.28 This was followed by a preliminary examination conducted by an employee of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS") who was authorized to take testimony, administer oaths, subpoena witnesses, and order production of documents. 29 At the conclusion of this examination, the preliminary
22 DeSipio and Pachon, 12 Chicano-Latino L Rev at 55-56 (cited in note 4), citing
Steven P. Erie, Rainbow's End: Irish Americans and The Dilemmas of Urban Machine
Politics, 1840-1985 51 (California 1988).
23 Report to the President of the Commission on Naturalization, HR Doc No 46, 59th
Cong, 1st Sess 11 (Dec 5, 1905).
24 Id at 12.

25 See Act of June 29, 1906, An Act: To establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and to provide for a uniform rule for the naturalization of aliens throughout
the United States, Pub L No 59-338, 34 Stat 596.
26 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-649, 104 Stat 4978, codified in various
sections of title 8 (1994).
27 8 USC § 1421(b) (1988).

28 8 USC § 1421(b)(5) (1988).
29 8 USC § 1446(b) (1988).
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examiner would submit a recommendation to the naturalization
court to grant, deny, or continue the petition. 30 In practice, INS
examiners encouraged many petitioners whose applications were
opposed by the agency to withdraw their applications. 31 Once a
court received a recommendation to approve or deny an application, it would generally follow the recommendation. 32 The statute
provided several circumstances under which a hearing would be
required in open court: if no preliminary examination had been
completed, if the petitioner demanded examination of herself under oath, or if the court, in its discretion, concluded that it was
33
appropriate to initiate an examination under oath.
The pre-1990 act provisions contemplated a role for the court
that fit neither the model of judicial review of agency action nor a
full civil litigation model. The agency's initial examination permitted the court to make a decision on naturalization without
any further factual inquiry. The statute also guaranteed the applicant the right to a court hearing where the applicant could be
examined by the judge under oath instead of the court relying
solely on the report of the preliminary examiner. Nothing in the
statute indicated that the court hearing would require a separate
pre-hearing investigation of the qualifications of the applicant.
In the 1980s, delay and inaccessibility were the primary con34
cerns voiced about the system for adjudicating naturalizations.
The House Report for a bill that became the template for the
1990 reforms reported: "Fully qualified applicants must wait two
years in some places to be sworn in as a U.S. citizen. This, of
course, affects employment opportunities, travel plans, and conferring of immigration benefits on relatives, and most impor-

30 8 USC § 1446(c) (1988).

31 See DeSipio and Pachon, 12 Chicano-Latino L Rev at 58-59 (cited in note 4) (reporting that inclusion of withdrawn cases in data from 1988 would increase denial rates
from 2 percent to 25 percent).
32 Naturalization Amendments of 1989, HR Rep No 101-187, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 10
(1989) (noting courts almost always follow agency recommendations for granting or denying citizenship).
33 8 USC § 1447 (1988). Subsection (a) of the pre-1990 version of 8 USC § 1447 provided that an applicant would testify under oath in open court. Subsection (b), however,
provided that this requirement would not apply when there had been a preliminary examination by the agency. In cases where there had been a preliminary examination,
subsection (b) provided that "the court may, in its discretion, and shall, upon demand of
the petitioner, require the examination of the petitioner under oath before the court and
in the presence of the court."
34 A major study of the American naturalization program concluded that it was filled
with roadblocks that undermined the interest in assuring that eligible people were naturalized. See North, 21 Intl Migration Rev at 325-26 (cited in note 4).
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tantly, deprives these individuals of their right to vote. '35 Only
the courts could award naturalization, and the courts were backlogged. The House also expressed concern that the delayed process was a "quagmire" that discouraged immigrants from naturalizing and deprived the country of "a traditional source of produc36
tive and informed citizenry."
The House Report also expressed concern with cases that
experienced unusual delays. The Report stated that some cases
were "placed on the 'backburner' due to indecisiveness on the
part of an examiner."3 7 In proposing the judicial review provisions subsequently enacted in 1990, the House Report explained
that "citizenship is the most valued governmental benefit of this
land and applicants should receive full recourse to the Judiciary
when the request for that benefit is denied." 38 Thus, Congress
sought to achieve two major goals: to "streamline" the process of
acquiring citizenship so as to solve the problem of40 unnecessary
delays, 39 and to preserve full recourse to the courts.
B.

Administrative and Judicial Roles under the 1990 Act

The Immigration Act of 1990, for the first time, provided an
executive agency with the formal power to award citizenship. At
the same time, it maintained robust provisions for court intervention both to review denials and to assure that applicants obtain a speedy evaluation of their claim to citizenship.
Under the 1990 Act, the basic process for adjudicating naturalization cases removes the courts from any involvement in
41
cases in which the agency is prepared to award citizenship.
Thus there is no advance notice to the courts of an application
and citizenship can be granted by the executive branch following
an examination by an agency adjudicator. 42 The design of the
administrative adjudication provisions basically substitutes executive authority to make a determination where the prior stat43
ute required the final recommendation to be sent to the court.
35 HR Rep No 101-187 at 8 (cited in note 32).
36 Id.
37 Id at 12.
38 Id at 14.

39 HR Rep No 101-187 at 8 (cited in note 32).
40 Id at 14.

41 INA § 335(d), 8 USC § 1446(d).
42 Id (providing that the "employee designated" shall determine whether to grant or
deny application for citizenship).
43 See 8 USC § 1446.
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When the initial examiner denies an application, however,
the 1990 Act replaces the prior system of a direct review in court
with an administrative hearing system. Under the 1990 Act, the
denied applicant may request a "hearing" before an immigration
officer. 44 At the hearing, the statute provides a right to subpoena
witnesses. 45 By regulation, however, the actual process that is
provided is far less than the term "hearing" suggests. The regulation states that the hearing officer need only be of the same
grade as the one who made the original decision. 46 Although the
statute refers to the appeal process as a "hearing," the regulation
provides that the reviewing officer may choose to conduct an informal review process or a de novo hearing. 47 The officer may
review "any administrative record which was created as part of
the examination procedures" and may review any other "Service
files and reports." 48 Thus, the regulations allow for a highly informal type of review. The agency appears to have continued to
think of its adjudicatory role in a way that matched its role before the statutory change, namely, to conduct a preliminary investigation rather than to act as an adjudicator. Although Congress provided the agency with the authority to provide a hearing mechanism at the agency level, it never created a mechanism
that could play the role that had previously been performed by
the courts.
After the applicant has exhausted the administrative process, the 1990 Act provides that the applicant may seek review of
the denial of the naturalization petition in district court. 49 It further states that this review "shall be de novo, and the court shall
make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall, at
the request of the petitioner, conduct a hearing de novo on the
application." 50
The 1990 Act also enacted a special judicial review provision
to address cases that languish at the agency. Under this provision, an applicant is able to go to district court if the immigration
agency fails to issue a decision within 120 days of the initial examination. 51 When a petition is filed on the basis of agency delay,
44 INA § 336, 8 USC § 1447.
45 8 USC § 1447(d).
46 8 CFR § 336.2 (2007).
47 Id.
48 Id.

49 8 USC § 1421(c).
50 Id.

51 8 USC § 1447(b).
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"[s]uch court has jurisdiction over the matter and may either determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate in52
structions, to the Service to determine the matter."
Although worded slightly differently from the pre-1990 statute, the 1990 Act's provision for the substantive judicial role contains the same basic structure as prior law. Unlike typical
agency review statutes, the 1990 Act contemplates a role for the
court in conducting factual hearings. But it does not require a
factual hearing. The added delay provision contemplates a role
for the court either as an adjudicator of fact or as a supervisory
body that can instruct the agency to issue a decision on the merits. While maintaining the same basic structure of judicial intervention, Congress created an agency empowered to resolve naturalization cases. That change has led to considerable confusion in
sorting through the proper role for the courts in naturalization
cases.
II. THE FAILED PROMISE OF EFFECTIVE
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NATURALIZATION
In 1990, Congress clearly stated its intent to ensure robust
judicial oversight of naturalization for those who are wrongly
denied, or who suffer delay in, the adjudication of their applications. The system Congress created has achieved only partial
success. By providing a route to court, the system has highlighted many important problems with administrative naturalization decisions and has precipitated some changes in agency
practices. An initial examination of the cases that are emerging
in the courts 53 suggests that there are problems both in the design of the provisions for judicial intervention and in the implementation of those provisions by the courts.

52 Id.

53 Data from the Office of Immigration Litigation at the Justice Department indicate
that while the caseload of naturalization cases is growing, it remains small. In 1997, 83
cases were filed in federal district courts concerning delays or denials of naturalization
applications. In 2005, that number increased to 398 cases. And a little more than half
way through 2006, the number reached 586 cases. E-mail from David McConnell, Office
of Immigration Litigation (July 27, 2006). These higher numbers reflect nationwide backlogs in naturalization, frustration with those backlogs, and a campaign by lawyers to take
backlogged cases to court. See Sarah Karush, Speeding Up Naturalization:US to Change
Procedures amid Litigation Threat, Boston Globe (April 26, 2006), available at
<http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/04/26/speeding-up-naturalization/>
(last visited Apr 14, 2007) (noting that an Arab-American rights group was threatening
mass court filings due to delays in the administrative naturalization process).
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Cases Involving Delayed Adjudications

The House Report leading to the 1990 Act explained that the
purpose for creating jurisdiction over cases delayed at the agency
level was to prevent cases from languishing on the back burner.
By allowing for access to courts after 120 days, the Act provided
a prompt route to a judicial forum for resolving the naturalization question.
The design adopted by Congress, however, only provides an
express remedy for delay at one stage of the process: the time
between an initial examination and a decision. There is no similar provision when the examination itself has been delayed.
Similarly, there is no express statutory provision to go to court if
the agency's appeal process is delayed after the agency renders
an initial decision. Delay is only expressly recognized as a basis
for immediate judicial access when that delay has occurred at
one particular stage of the process.
The problem of delays, and of delays operating as de facto
denials, is present at all stages of the administrative process. If
the agency is only held responsible for delays that post-date the
examination, it can shift the delay to before the examination.
Indeed, the Department of Homeland Security changed its policy
under pressure of lawsuits and now conducts interviews only
after background checks. 54 This kind of manipulation obviously
undermines Congress's concern with assuring timely adjudications. A more effective provision on judicial review in cases of
delays would be worded to accommodate these differing situations in which the delay of the agency has become unreasonable.
But even where Congress expressly provided a mechanism
for judicial intervention, courts have been confused about the
role they should play. With respect to cases involving delays,
some courts see their role as adjudicating the cases due to the
agency's delay. 55 Others simply remand the case for a speedy adjudication. 56 The confusion about how to handle the interrela54 Juliana Barbassa, Immigrants Sue Over Delays in Processing Citizenship Applications, AP Alert - Business (Feb 9, 2007) ("Immigration officials now conduct name checks
before interviews, following the letter of the law but violating applicants' due process
rights, said Sin Yen Ling staff attorney with the Asian Law Caucus.").
55 See, for example, Meyersiek v USCIS, 2006 WL 1582397, *3 (D RI); Shalan v Chertoff, 2006 WL 3307512, *2-3 (D Mass); Shamsai v Gonzalez, 2006 WL 3003972, *3 (N D
Ga) ("Gonzalez" spelling in original).
56 See, for example, Daami v Gonzales, 2006 WL 1457862, *6 (D NJ); Eng v Chertoff,
2006 WL 2442894, *1 (S D Tex); Khelifa v Chertoff, 433 F Supp 2d 836, 842-45 (E D Mich
2006); Martinez v Gonzales, 2006 WL 3477985, *3 (E D Va) (finding the court lacked
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tionship of administrative and judicial systems is illustrated by
the dispositions of federal court delay cases when the agency
subsequently issues an administrative denial. Some courts have
concluded that the petitioner must exhaust the administrative
process and have dismissed the delay case as moot.5 7 Other
courts have exercised the authority to decide the case without
any further administrative process. 58 Each approach reflects a
fundamentally different view of the relationship between the
agency and court processes in the area of naturalization.
A presumption of remand in delay cases undermines the
statutory scheme of ready access to the courts in those cases. Because the naturalization statute contemplates court adjudication
of the factual issues in a naturalization case, there is no reason
to suppose that an agency decision must precede a court adjudication. Once the agency has failed to act in a timely manner, the
statute contemplates the court as an alternative venue for a
speedy determination of citizenship. In addition, if the only remedy for delay is a remand for a decision, the agency has little incentive to comply with the statutory time limit. Noncompliance
simply leads to more time to make a decision. The issue here is
how courts understand and use their authority, not how the
statute is structured. Although the 1990 statute, as in effect today, states that a court "may either determine the matter or remand the matter," 59 some courts have turned to classic administrative law cases for guidance. These cases are based on agency
processes in which there are developed hearings on the record
and the role of the courts is simply to review the agency's decisions. 60 The courts presume that the same logic applies under the
subject matter jurisdiction, but noting that it would have remanded the case even if jurisdiction had been appropriate); Stepchuk v Gonzales, 2006 WL 3361776, *4-5 (W D
Wash). In one case, the court issued an order to show cause why naturalization should
not be granted, which prompted the agency to issue a decision granting naturalization.
See Said v Gonzales, 2006 WL 2711765 (W D Wash); Joint Status Report, Said v Gonzales, Civil Action No 06-986 (W D Wash filed Nov 3, 2006) (granting citizenship to petitioners).
57 See Etape v Chertoff, 446 F Supp 2d 408, 417-18 (D Md 2006).
58 See United States v Hovsepian, 359 F3d 1144, 1159-64 (9th Cir 2004); Meyersik,
2006 WL 1582397 at *2-4.
59 8 USC § 1447(b).
60 See, for example, Khelifa, 433 F Supp 2d at 844 (stating that the agency has "the
experience and the expertise" to assess the meaning of findings in a background check
"while the Court has neither"); Stepchuk, 2006 WL 3361776 at *5 (citing INS v Ventura,
537 US 12 (2002), for the proposition that "the agency can bring its expertise to bear upon
the matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can make an initial determination; and in
doing so, it can, through informed discussion and analysis, help a court later determine
whether its decision exceeds the leeway that the law allows.").
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naturalization statute. The naturalization statute, however, contemplates a very different kind of judicial role in which the
courts have de novo authority over naturalizations. Thus, while
remand is permitted, it is hardly required, and it may in fact undermine the fundamental purpose of ensuring that naturalization is not unduly delayed.
Despite these limitations, the delay provisions have served
an important role in providing judicial oversight of delayed naturalization applications. Some courts refuse to agree to remands
and have proceeded, as the statute contemplates, to adjudicate
the cases. In addition, courts often retain jurisdiction and monitor what happens at the agency in cases that are remanded. This
oversight can serve to speed agency action. 61 In addition, the delay provision has provided a basis for systemic litigation in situations where there have been widespread delays, and it has
heightened public awareness of the problem of delayed adjudica62
tions.
B.

Cases Involving Standards and Procedures for Court
Adjudications on the Merits

Congress also expressed concern in 1990 about preserving
"full recourse to the Judiciary" when citizenship is denied. 63 Congress did not, however, elaborate on how that full recourse was
meant to work. Some courts have responded by reviewing naturalization cases on the basis of the agency record 64 or following a
hearing in court. 65 Other courts take the view that full-scale civil
discovery is appropriate before the court can make a decision on
naturalization. 66 As with the delay cases, these approaches re61 See, for example, Said, 2006 WL 2711765, *4 (remanding and requiring a status
report within four weeks); Joint Status Report, Said v Gonzales, Civil Action No 06-986
(granting citizenship to petitioners).
62 For class litigation, see, for example, Memorandum and Order, Yakubova v Chertoff, Civil Action No 06-3203, *8-9 (E D NY filed Nov 2, 2006) (denying dismissal of preliminary injunction and reporting expedited processes for class members). For public
attention, see, for example, Kathy Kiely, For Legal Immigrants, Wait Can Be Daunting:
The Road to Citizenship Can Take a Generation, USA Today 1A (May 16, 2006) (noting
that the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee has gone to federal court in 13
states over "undue delays in processing citizenship applications").
63 HR Rep No 101-187 at 14 (cited in note 32).
64 See, for example, Butt v United States Citizenship and Immigration Service, 2007
WL 446922 (D NJ) (dismissing petition for review on the basis of the agency record).
65 See, for example, Epie v Caterisano,402 F Supp 2d 589, 591 (D Md 2005) (expressing view that case cannot be remanded and scheduling a hearing).
66 See, for example, Order Permitting Discovery, Zaranska v DHS, Civil Action No
04-169 (E D NY Dec 8, 2005) (permitting discovery); Hovsepian, 359 F3d at 1162-64 (dis-
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flect fundamentally different views about the institutional role of
the courts.
A central institutional issue is the relationship between the
agency's fact development process and any additional fact development in the courts. In some courts, the government argues
that the court case is a new proceeding in which the administrative record is irrelevant and the court is obliged to permit discovery.67 In districts that accept these arguments, defending a deposition of a naturalization petitioner has become a standard part
of the cost of filing a judicial petition for naturalization. 68 One
attorney estimates that as a result of discovery demands, he
would charge at least $10,000 to file a naturalization case in the
69
Eastern District of New York.
When courts permit full discovery in naturalization petitions, they undermine full recourse to the courts in two ways.
First, they make the recourse too expensive. The basic factgathering tools of civil litigation-interrogatories, document demands, and depositions 7 0 -cost money. If discovery is routinely
available to the government in naturalization cases, the petitioners must be prepared to pay for legal representation to answer
these discovery requests. Second, courts that authorize full discovery permit a double standard for naturalization investigations. Those who have been denied are subjected to a more extensive and intrusive form of investigation, whether or not that
denial was improper on the basis of the record developed at the
agency. This scenario is particularly problematic since the requirements for citizenship have long included expansively
worded standards such as "good moral character." 71 Given the
broad-based nature of civil discovery in which a party may request anything "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence," 72 depositions pose the danger of becoming
full interrogations into petitioners' lives.
Although an inquiry into qualifications for naturalization is
appropriate and has been authorized since 1906, there is no clear
cussing discovery in the agency and the courts).
67 See, for example, Order Permitting Discovery, Zaranska, Civil Action No 04-169;
Chan v Gantner, 1:05-CV-04378 (E D NY May 5, 2006) (permitting discovery).
68 Affidavit of Matthew Guadagno, dated Feb 9, 2006, attached to Letter of Rachel S.
Coen and Stephanie Welch, dated Feb. 10, 2006, Chan v Gantner, 1:05-CV-04378. The
author served as the supervising attorney for the petitioner in Chan.
69 Id.

70 FRCP 26(a)(5).
71 INA § 316(a)(3), 8 USC § 1427(a)(3).
72 FRCP 26(b)(1).
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basis for more intrusive investigation of those individuals who
take their cases to court than for those whose cases are adjudicated at the agency. Thus, to the extent factual development is
needed, it ought to be part of the agency record and should not
require further development in court. Courts that nonetheless
permit such discovery appear to presume that a naturalization
petition is simply another civil case subject to the general rules
73
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ironically, courts that accede to government requests to use
a civil litigation model in cases that come to them on the merits
are adopting the opposite approach from courts that accept the
government's arguments for remand in delay cases. In these remand cases, courts that insist on remand accept a model where
the agency must make a decision first so that the court can review the decision. If there is reason to have the agency act first,
why would the court assume that the record developed at the
agency should be set aside and a new record developed in court?
Furthermore, why would the record need to be augmented by
testimony at a court hearing? Any such augmentation would
suggest that there is an independent role for the courts in adjudicating naturalization and there would be no need for the
agency to act first on a more limited record.

III. UNDERSTANDING THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN
NATURALIZATION CASES

At the root of the courts' confusion over naturalization cases
is an effort to force these cases into the mold of either standard
review of agency action or into general models of civil litigation.
Neither of these models fits the statutory scheme Congress enacted in 1990. The text of the 1990 Act contemplates a mixed role
for the court in which it can make de novo findings on the record
or conduct a hearing at the request of the petitioner in cases
heard on the merits, and in which the court has the power to engage in substantive adjudication of a naturalization application
when the agency has not issued a timely decision. In addition,
neither the civil litigation nor the administrative review models
are well-suited to achieve the statute's legitimate goal: an expe73 The Federal Rules contain a provision that states that they apply to citizenship "to
the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set out in the statutes of the
United States." FRCP 81(a). The procedure for naturalization is set out in 8 USC
§§ 1421(c) and 1447(b), which provide for a decision on the record or a hearing but not for
a new round of investigation.
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ditious and nondiscriminatory system for assuring that petitioners who are eligible for citizenship can actually become citizens.
Yet the models are so familiar that some judges and legislators
operate on the assumption that these cases must conform to one
of those models.
A.

Five Goals

An adjudicatory system for naturalization cases should accommodate five goals. These goals are rooted in the importance
of citizenship, its role in determining access to the franchise, and
the realities of the size of the immigrant population that is eligible to naturalize. First, the system should protect the interests of
applicants and provide safeguards against arbitrary and discriminatory denials of citizenship. Equal treatment norms take
on special significance with citizenship. Although the history of
United States citizenship laws is replete with de jure discrimination, 74 the statute now expressly repudiates discriminatory
treatment. 75 As Justice Brandeis stated, those who meet the criteria for citizenship are entitled to become citizens. 76 Thus, a system that does a reasonably good job may not be good enough.
Instead, the system must provide adequate checks to protect the
77
rights of those who are eligible for citizenship.
Second, the system should avoid politicization of access to
the franchise. Citizenship allows for voting, and voting is the

74 Consider Ian F. Haney-Lopez, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (NYU
1996) (describing history of litigation around the meaning of "white" in pre-1952 naturalization laws).
75 Citizenship law expressly prohibits the denial or abridgement of the right to be a
naturalized citizen "because of race or sex or because such person is married." INA § 311,
codified at 8 USC § 1422.
76 Tutun v United States, 270 US 568, 578 (1926) (Brandeis, J.). Brandeis explains:
It is true that the Constitution does not confer upon aliens the right to naturalization. But it authorizes Congress to establish a uniform rule therefore. The opportunity having been conferred by the Naturalization Act, there is a statutory
right in the alien to submit his petition and evidence to a court, to have that
tribunal pass upon them, and, if the requisite facts are established, to receive
the certificate [of citizenship].
Id at 578 (citations omitted). Consider INA § 311, 8 USC § 1422 (treating naturalization
as a "right" in the context of marital status).
77 Hiroshi Motomura offers a powerful argument that not just those who are at the
cusp of citizenship, but those who are on their way to becoming citizens, deserve to be
treated as "Americans in Waiting." Motomura, Americans in Waiting at 189-200 (cited in
note 4). A natural extension of his argument is that procedures for citizenship should be
highly protective of applicants who meet eligibility standards. Others might disagree on
the level of protection that should be accorded those on the road to citizenship.
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quintessential political right. A system that allows access to the
franchise to be politicized threatens to undermine basic fairness
in our political institutions. The scandals of the turn of the twentieth century highlight the dangers of a system that too easily
allows political interests to facilitate naturalizing ineligible immigrants. 78 Similarly, recent delays in granting citizenship suggest that a party that does not expect to do as well with recent
immigrants could take advantage of its power over the citizenship process to delay applications. 79 Judicial review that provides
robust access to the judiciary for those denied citizenship serves
to check such politicization.
Third, the system should be designed to accommodate the
large numbers of persons who are eligible to seek citizenship.
Total petitions for citizenship are running at a rate of over half a
million a year.80 Such a large system requires an institution that
is capable of adjudicating large numbers of cases.
Fourth, the system should provide methods of oversight that
provide feedback for adjudicators who make erroneous decisions
or apply improper standards. Because adjudicators must handle
large numbers of cases, it is important that they know when they
are applying the wrong standards. Feedback, from superiors or
from courts, can assure that the next application is adjudicated
under the correct standards.
Finally, the system should be accessible. Judicial review that
imposes high costs on those who seek review threatens to operate
as a poll tax. Those who can afford the tax will have access to the
franchise. Those who do not will be left with erroneous denials of
their naturalization applications.
B.

Comparing Models

Viewed against these goals, the current statutory scheme
compares favorably against the pure administrative review and
civil litigation models. Neither of these conventional models ad-

78 See DeSipio and Pachon, 12 Chicano-Latino L Rev at 55-56 (cited in note 4) (describing Tammany Hall bosses arranging for naturalization of Irish immigrants in return
for their political support).
79 Kathy Kiely, Immigration Bills Curb Court Reviews, USA Today 1A (June 1, 2006)
(quoting attorney Robert Gibbs, "Should you have a political branch of the government
deciding who gets to vote?").
80 Office of Immigration Statistics, 2005 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 52
(2006), available at <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbookl2005/OIS_
2005_Yearbook.pdf> (last visited Apr 14, 2007).
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dresses the multiplicity of appropriate goals for a system that
governs access to citizenship.
1. Administrative review model.
A pure administrative review model meets the concern with
the size of the system. Agencies are well positioned to adjudicate
large numbers of cases and achieve a form of "bureaucratic justice."81 Agency adjudication can also be accessible, although recent increases in the fees for citizenship applications threaten to
make the existing agency process less so. 8 2 An agency-based sys-

tem, however, fails on other counts. It is at serious risk of being
influenced by politics if the incumbent administration is interested in hindering access to citizenship. By delaying naturalization, the executive can prevent future citizens from obtaining the
franchise and can thereby prevent opposing votes. Even the appearance of such manipulation of the right to vote can be poisonous.
An administrative review model, with typical standards of
deferential judicial review, also fails to serve as an effective
check on discriminatory denials of citizenship. A line adjudicator's assessment of "good moral character" could easily be influenced by discriminatory attitudes. Deferential review makes it
difficult to unearth such attitudes and assess their role in factual
determinations. A de novo assessment of the individual applicant
in court offers a chance at an independent evaluation.
Even if there were no threat of bias, agency review models
for important entitlements depend on systems of agency adjudication that are more formal and robust than those currently used
in naturalization petitions.8 3 The current system for agency hearings allows an officer of equal grade to review the initial decision
and does not even require that officer to make a decision on the
record. To move to the kind of system envisioned by the 2006
81 Consider Jerry L. Mashaw, BureaucraticJustice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims (Yale 1983) (describing administrative scheme for managing social security
disability claims).
82 Consider Spencer S. Hsu and Darryl Fears, Immigration Application Fees to Rise
by 80 Percent, Wash Post A2 (Jan 31, 2007).
83 For example, the system for evaluation of eligibility for Social Security benefits
includes a hearing before an administrative judge who keeps a formal record of the proceedings. 20 CFR §§ 404.944-404.953 (2006). There are no comparable administrative
hearings in naturalization cases. 8 CFR § 336.2 (2006) (authorizing a 'less formal review
procedure" than a hearing and providing for review by an officer of the same grade as the
initial examining officer).
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Senate bill,8 4 in which agency naturalization decisions are reviewed on the record established by the agency, would, at a
minimum, require development of more complete agency records
that can serve as the sole basis for evaluating eligibility for citizenship.
For an administrative review system to work properly, and
provide feedback to agency adjudicators on erroneous decisions,
the agency must develop and produce written records of its findings and the facts on which those findings are based. The agency
must then have a way for adjudicators to learn when they have
misapplied standards. This cannot happen unless agency adjudicators learn about judicial decisions on the proper meaning and
application of the rules on eligibility.
Finally, a purely administrative model only offers a check on
erroneous agency denials and does not address the problem of
delays. As the delay cases illustrate, delay can be equivalent to
denial. If we view citizenship as a critical right, and those who
apply as "Americans in Waiting, ''8 5 an administrative model cannot provide adequate protection for the timely adjudication of the
rights of those who are eligible.
2. The civil litigation model.
A civil litigation model raises different issues. It provides a
layer of protection against the workings of politics. If the court is
the fact finder, it should be relatively free from the particular
political calculations that would counsel against naturalizing a
particular demographic group at a particular time. In addition,
the court can provide an independent assessment of the individual's qualifications for citizenship and therefore offers the hope
of a substantial check on wrongful denials of citizenship.
The use of civil discovery in the civil litigation model, however, undermines much of the promise of the courts' independent
role. At the court stage, those who were denied by the agency are
subject to a new round of investigation through the robust tools
of civil discovery. No matter how well the court oversees the discovery process, discovery will be expensive and will threaten to
intrude into all aspects of an individual's life. This intrusive discovery becomes the price of court review and therefore can serve

84 S 2611 (cited in note 16).
85 Consider Motomura, Americans in Waiting (cited in note 4).
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to discourage persons who are eligible for citizenship and who
were wrongly denied by the agency.
A civil litigation model is also not well suited to provide
oversight of agency decisions. In the civil litigation model, the
court issues a decision on a different record from the agency. As a
result, its decision does not serve as an assessment of the correctness of the agency decision. Nor does the model serve to assess the believability of the petitioner after testimony in open
court. Instead, the civil litigation model creates a wholly new
record that has little to do with what happened at the agency
and is unlikely to influence how the agency decides subsequent
cases. By allowing the agency to conduct discovery and come up
with new reasons for denying naturalization, the civil litigation
model has the perverse effect of insulating agency decisions from
review and permitting greater and potentially discriminatory
scrutiny of those whose cases were wrongfully denied by the
agency.
Similarly, the civil litigation model is generally not well
suited to adjudicate large numbers of cases.8 6 Civil discovery is
cumbersome, and the federal courts lack the capacity to manage
large numbers of cases undergoing discovery. Indeed, the sheer
expense of civil discovery has probably served to keep the number of cases down, thereby allowing those courts that use a civil
discovery model to maintain that model and not be overwhelmed
by the task of overseeing discovery in substantial numbers of
cases. But the price of an effectively closed courthouse door for
denied applicants is hardly desirable.
86 One exception is when civil litigation is used to handle class litigation regarding
the agency's construction of the standards for citizenship. For instance, class litigation in
Seattle challenged the overly harsh application of the good moral character standard. One
of the named plaintiffs in that case, Kichul Lee, had been found to lack good moral character due to a single fine for harvesting too many oysters. Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Lee v Gonzales, Civil Action No C04-449-RSL, *7 (W D Wash filed July 1,
2004). In the Seattle District alone, this litigation led to the identification of 1,213 persons who had been denied citizenship on good moral character requirement. Declaration
of Michael P. Conricode, Lee v Gonzales, Civil Action No C04-449-RSL, *7 (W D Wash
filed Jan 27, 2006); 520 had subsequently reapplied and been granted citizenship. Id.
Another 205 faced statutory bars to naturalization. Id. But at least 403 had been denied
citizenship and had given up on their claims. Id. Through the class litigation, these individuals were provided an opportunity to have their cases reopened and readjudicated.
Settlement Agreement, Lee v Gonzales, Civil Action No C04-449-RSL (W D Wash filed
Nov 2, 2005), available at <http://www.ghp-law.net/Lee-vs-Gonzales.html> (last visited
Apr 14, 2007). Under the settlement, the agency agreed to examine both positive and
negative factors in determining good moral character and not to require perfect character-a standard that was well-established under case law. The Seattle case's use of class
litigation is unusual.
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3. The hybrid model.
The current statute can be read as rejecting both the agency
review model and the civil litigation model, instead constructing
a hybrid model that seeks to effectuate the many interests that
naturalization poses. Under this hybrid model, the court sits first
as a reviewer of an agency record. The court presides over a
streamlined factual hearing only when the petitioner so requests
or when the case has been delayed.
At the first stage, where the court reviews the record below
on a de novo basis, the court can exercise the advantages of the
agency review model. It can provide feedback by ruling on the
basis of the record created at the agency. In addition, the court is
relatively accessible. Because the court is looking at the record,
there is no need for discovery and a disappointed citizenship applicant could plausibly go to court on a pro se basis.
At the second stage, the court may conclude that it is unable
to evaluate some factor related to citizenship because, for example, it depends on an assessment of the credibility of the applicant. There may be a question about the degree of responsibility
an applicant takes for some past act and whether that act provides ground for questioning the applicant's "good moral character." To stick with the agency model at that stage would compromise the court's role in assuring that the denial was appropriate and was not made on discriminatory grounds or influenced
by the political agenda of one of the political branches. The
agency model would also constitute a major retreat in the historical role of courts as the final arbiters of whether an individual meets the standards for citizenship.
During the second stage, where the errors are not apparent
on the record and a hearing is necessary, a streamlined hearing
can serve to contain the accessibility problems that are posed by
full-scale litigation. A streamlined hearing does not necessitate
the expense of civil discovery. Although a streamlined hearing is
more complex than a review of a record, a hearing on the issues
that cannot be resolved on the basis of the record should be short
and relatively accessible. There should be no need for further
factual investigation, since the agency will have already had an
opportunity to conduct an investigation. The hearing provides
the applicant with the chance to have a judge, rather than a low
level agency official, hear and evaluate the applicant's testimony.
Given the great importance of citizenship and the serious consequences of denial, this system provides crucial protection to those
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who believe they have been unfairly denied the right to have
rights.
A hybrid model matches the way that the Immigration and
Nationality Act treats the cases of persons charged with removal
who claim to be citizens. In the judicial review scheme for removal orders, those who claim to be citizens and who raise genuine factual questions about their citizenship are provided with an
extra layer of protection. They are allowed by statute to have
their factual claims sent to a district court to be evaluated de
novo. 8 7 Those who are lawful permanent residents, who meet the
criteria for citizenship, have a similar claim to be citizens but for
the failure to adjudicate their cases properly. As putative citizens, they look to the courts, as they have since 1790, to ensure
that their citizenship claims are properly adjudicated.
Properly applied, the hybrid model could lead to a greater
number of cases in the district courts than we see today, and
therefore could plausibly raise questions of the capacity of the
courts. At this stage, however, the number of cases in the district
courts is extremely small, especially in light of the number of
claims being adjudicated at the agency. Applicants have incentives to file new applications rather than pursue appeals since
even with increased fees, new applications may be less expensive
than appeals. If capacity were to become a problem, a variety of
solutions could address such issues short of effectively closing off
access to the courts. 8 8 These speculative possibilities provide no
reason to depart from the hybrid model, which serves the objectives of providing rigorous protection of those who have met the
requirements for citizenship.
CONCLUSION
As courts and Congress struggle to fit naturalization cases
into pre-existing models of civil litigation or administrative review, they would do well to reconsider the hybrid model that
Congress set forth in the naturalization statute. This model com87 INA § 242(b)(5), codified at 8 USC § 1252(b)(5).
88 If there were capacity problems, Congress could authorize magistrate judges to

hear citizenship cases. It could also authorize state courts to hear these cases. In some
ways, state courts could be an ideal venue for evaluating whether an individual meets
such standards as showing good moral character, which are supposed to be based on the
standards of the community. Consider Posusta v United States, 285 F2d 533, 535 (2d Cir
1961) (noting that good moral character "is a test incapable of exact definition; the best
we can do is to improvise the response that the 'ordinary' man or woman would make, if
the question were put whether the conduct was consistent with a 'good moral character."')
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ports with the history and complexity of naturalization cases and
the courts' special role in protecting access to full membership in
our society. Before Congress intervenes and alters this system, it
should be clear that it understands how the system works, how
the system protects against unfair denials, and how the system
wisely ensures meaningful judicial oversight.

